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Gruber: An Unintended Casualty of the War on Terror

AN UNINTENDED CASUALTY OF
THE WAR ON TERROR
Aya Gruber∗
ABSTRACT
As the dust of the Bush administration’s war on terror settles,
casualties are starting to appear on the legal battlefield. The United
States’ human rights reputation and the Supreme Court’s
international influence lay wounded in the wake of U.S. policies that
flouted international law by advocating torture, suborning indefinite
detention, and erecting irregular tribunals. Through declining citation,
the courts of the world are telling the Supreme Court that if it does
not respect international and foreign law, international and foreign
courts will not respect it. Some might object that the Supreme Court
should not be lumped with the Bush administration because in fact it
handed down several opinions setting limitations on the
administration’s treatment of terror detainees. While these cases,
notably Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, set forth domestic law limitations, their
conspicuous effort to avoid giving the Geneva Conventions the force
of law served to confirm world opinion that the Supreme Court is
“out of step.” This Essay demonstrates how the Court’s avoidance of
the treaty status issue in Hamdan not only contributed to the
perception of American legal exceptionalism but also paved the way
for the single most anti-international opinion in Supreme Court
history, Medellín v. Texas. In Medellín, the Supreme Court adopted a
legal stance that creates near impassable barriers to the domestic
enforcement of treaties. Nonetheless, as President Obama ruminates
on maintaining military tribunals and courts brace for another round
of terrorism cases, the Supreme Court may yet have a chance to
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the seminal treaty jurisprudence scholarship of Jordan Paust, Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Louis Henkin,
and David Sloss, and to them I am particularly indebted. All errors, of course, are my own.
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narrow the reach of Medellín, confirm the enforceability of the
Geneva Conventions, and restore its international influence.
INTRODUCTION
The United States’ war on terror has produced a lesser-discussed
but very important casualty: the international reputation of the
Supreme Court. Today, many scholars both within and outside the
United States note the dwindling influence of the U.S. Supreme
Court, as evidenced by declining worldwide citation. On September
17, 2008, the front page of the New York Times declared, “U.S. Court
Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations.”1 The article observes that citations
to the Canadian Supreme Court and European Court of Justice are on
an upswing, especially in cases involving human rights, while,
according to Professor Anne Marie Slaughter, “We are losing one of
the greatest bully pulpits we have ever had.”2 The bottom line is that
much of today’s world views U.S. Supreme Court opinion as
antiquated and out-of-step with modern constructions of global rights
and obligations.3 To be sure, several aspects of American legal
practice garnered international disfavor even before the September 11
attacks, notably the nation’s continued legal support for the death
penalty.4 Subsequently, the war on terror and its concurrent
destruction of civil liberties, embrace of torture and indefinite
detention, and contempt for international humanitarian law cemented
the widespread view of America as the prototypical abuser of human
rights rather than guarantor.5 In short, the courts of the world are
1. Adam Liptak, U.S. Court Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at A1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/us/18legal.html.
2. Id.
3. See id. (noting that the decline of U.S. Supreme Court influence can be attributed in part to “new
and sophisticated” constitutional courts that are more liberal than the U.S. Supreme Court).
4. See John Quigley, “If You Are Not A United States Citizen . . .”: International Requirements in
the Arrest of Foreigners, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 661, 666−67 (2009) (noting negative public opinion in
Europe towards death penalty and discussing foreign states’ interventions in U.S. death penalty cases on
behalf of foreign defendants).
5. David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil over the Guantánamo
Military Commissions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131, 133 (2008) (observing that because of the
United States’ “[r]efusal to apply the Geneva Conventions, indefinite detentions based on flimsy
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saying that if the U.S. does not respect international and foreign law,
international and foreign courts will not respect the U.S.6
As President Obama recedes from his initial stance against ad hoc
military justice7 and federal courts prepare for another round of
military tribunal challenges,8 we should remain poignantly focused
on the reputational damage caused by the Bush administration’s
“cowboy adventure into totalitarianism,”9 which was permitted to
push forward even by “liberal” “obstructionist” Supreme Court
decisions.10 As we move into a new era of international relations and
(hopefully) respect for human rights, the time is ripe to learn some
lessons about what was and what was not decided in the Supreme
Court terrorism cases. This Essay highlights how an unfortunate
misstep in the seemingly internationalist Hamdan v. Rumsfeld11
decision paved the way for a jurisprudence of hostility toward
international law. In this way, progressive Justices actually became
complicit in the legal isolationist ideology so prevalent during the
Bush era, which led the courts of the world to abandon the Supreme
Court.

evidence, detainee abuse, and the questionable invasion of Iraq . . . American stature in world public
opinion has declined from sympathetic victim to pariah.”).
6. David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1, 60–61 (2002) [hereinafter Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties] (asserting that the United States’
“cynical” approach to international law is contrary to its national interests).
7. Obama issued a campaign statement asserting, “It’s time to better protect the American people
and our values by bringing swift and sure justice to terrorists through our courts and our Uniform Code
of Military Justice.” See Obama Speaks on Hamdan Conviction, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 6, 2008, available at
http://www.swamppolitics.com/news/politics/blog/2008/08/obama_speaks_on_hamdan_convict.html.
He has since retreated from that promise. See also infra notes 191−96.
8. See Peter Finn, Obama Set to Revive Military Commissions, WASH. POST, May 9, 2009, at A1,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/08/AR2009050804228.
html; see infra note 194.
9. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Remarks at the Investiture of Eric M. Freedman as the Maurice A.
Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 403, 415 (2004).
10. See infra notes 49−51 and accompanying text (discussing perception of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557 (2006), as a victory for liberals).
11. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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I. A GLOBALIST COURT IN AN AGE OF NATIONALISM
There can be little dispute that during the Bush administration
years, especially those immediately following September 11,
internationalism fell out of popular and political favor. Guantánamo,
renditions, torture, and the unilateral invasion of Iraq served as stark
examples of the United States’ go-it-alone mentality regarding human
rights and humanitarian law. This attitude was arguably a
continuation
of
the
administration’s
pre-September
11
“exceptionalist”12 approach to human rights.13 Foreign jurists and
human rights supporters had already been shocked at President
Bush’s “unsigning” of the Rome Statute, thereby withdrawing
support for the International Criminal Court,14 and the United States’
refusal to participate in international environmental regulation.15 Of
course, after September 11, as isolationist sentiment rose, America’s
acceptance of international law further decreased.
Indeed, many Americans, including important legal actors, openly
express contempt for international law and legal institutions.16 In this
view, international human rights law is a dirty phrase synonymous
with loss of American sovereignty and radical liberal ideology.17
Following September 11, isolationist sentiment intensified as society
became increasingly averse to international law, foreign values, and
12. The term “exceptionalism” is used to describe the view that “as the exceptional nation, America
should be a model . . . with a special and unique destiny to lead the rest of the world to freedom and
democracy.” Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1582−83 (2006). Thus, “American
exceptionalism has always had two sides: the one eager to set the world to rights, the other ready to turn
its back with contempt if its message should be ignored.” MARGARET MACMILLAN, PEACEMAKERS:
THE PARIS CONFERENCE OF 1919 AND ITS ATTEMPT TO END WAR 22 (2001).
13. See Philippe Sands, Lawless World? The Bush Administration and Iraq: Issues of International
Legality and Criminality, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 295, 301 (2006) (noting that the “[war
on terror]” provided a “terrific opportunity to promote the ‘anti-international law’ project”).
14. See Jean Galbraith, The Bush Administration’s Response to the International Criminal Court, 21
BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 683, 686−90 (2003).
15. See Karin Mickelson, Leading Towards a Level Playing Field, Repaying Ecological Debt, or
Making Environmental Space: Three Stories About International Environmental Cooperation, 43
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 137, 143−47 (2005).
16. See Liptak, supra note 1 (“Americans are deeply suspicious of foreign law.”).
17. See Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 52 (2004)
(describing “nationalist jurisprudence” in which foreign law is considered “irrelevant, or worse yet, an
impermissible imposition on the exercise of American sovereignty”).
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even foreigners.18 Today, conservatives warn against the corrupting
influence of foreign practices and characterize international law as a
product of “elite” law professors who are not representative of the
nation’s views.19 The body of international scholars has been
described by even prominent law professors as either “feather boawearing”20 liberal snobs intent on imposing patrician continental
norms on ordinary American folk,21 or worse, terrorism
sympathizers.22 One professor characterized the Supreme Court’s
citation of foreign and international sources as a product of
“aristocratic” global “bonding” sessions at “Lake Como or the South
of France.”23
However, if the executive’s actions and public opinion confirmed
to the world that the United States disdains international law, what
about actions of the Supreme Court itself? In the early part of the
decade it appeared that an emerging globalist Supreme Court attitude
could provide a much-needed foil to the existence and perception of
American legal exceptionalism.24 Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
former Justice O’Connor vocally extolled the importance of
18. See Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Inaction, 50 HOW. L.J. 611, 679 (2007) (“[I]n the post 9/11
environment . . . heightened security concerns have also generated heightened levels of xenophobic
animosity . . . .”).
19. John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 303, 314 (2006).
20. This is an actual quote from a law professor who shall remain nameless.
21. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
291, 330 (2005) (arguing that internationalist judges “stand at the very apex of [international] elites”).
22. See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Nationalism in the Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV. 867, 879 (2004)
(calling the internationalist “a rudderless person in search of a fundamental identity [who] may well find
himself or herself in the comfort of zealotry and the community of terror”); see also U.S. DEP’T. OF
DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5 (Mar. 2005)
[hereinafter DEFENSE STATEMENT], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/
d20050318nds2.pdf (“Our strength as a nation-state will continue to be challenged by those who employ
a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism.”).
23. McGinnis, supra note 19, at 327. To be sure, decrying liberal pretention has been a time-honored
rhetorical strategy of old segregationists and modern neo-conservatives. Recall Dan Quayle’s
description of the “liberal elites” as sneering, cynical, sophisticates who supported radical ideologies
like gay rights. Andrew Rosenthal, The 1992 Campaign; Quayle Attacks a “Cultural Elite,” Saying It
Mocks Nation’s Values, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1992, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/10/us/1992-campaign-quayle-attacks-cultural-elite-saying-it-mocksnation-s-values.html.
24. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 176 (2004) (calling recent Court activity a “breakthrough” in the
“internationalization of the law” (quoting Charlotte Ku & Christopher J. Borgen, American Lawyers and
International Competence, 18 DICK. J. INT’L L. 493, 505–11 (2000))).
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international and comparative law in domestic constitutional
jurisprudence.25 In the 2003 decision Lawrence v. Texas, the Court
cited international norms as part of its analysis striking down antisodomy laws.26 In 2005, the Court took up the hotly-contested issue
of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons.27 In a move that
many conservatives saw, and continue to see, as an all-out assault on
American values and sovereignty, the Court cited international
sentiment as “confirmation” of its formal conclusion that putting
juveniles to death is cruel and unusual.28 Many, like Justice Ginsburg,
believed that the Court’s “‘island’ or ‘lone ranger’ mentality [was]
beginning to change.”29
The Supreme Court was in the midst of a modest revolution,
inching towards globalization despite great internal conflict30 and
external controversy.31 At the same time, the Court was asked to
25. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., The Supreme Court and
The New International Law, Remarks to the American Society of International Law (Apr. 4, 2003),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-04-03.html (“[E]ver stronger
consensus (now near world-wide) as to the importance of protecting basic human rights, the
embodiment of that consensus in legal documents, such as national constitutions and international
treaties, and the related decision to enlist judges—i.e., independent judiciaries—as instruments to help
make that protection effective in practice.”); see also Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 6, at
21–24 (discussing statements from Justices regarding international and foreign law).
26. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
27. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
28. Id. at 575 (“Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for
offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the
world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”).
29. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative
Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 335 (2004). Still, some
remained skeptical of the Court’s burgeoning devotion to international norms. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust,
International Law Before the Supreme Court: A Mixed Record of Recognition, 45 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 829, 855 (2005) [hereinafter Paust, Mixed Record] (noting that in 2004 term, Supreme Court
viewed international law “obliquely” and often used it merely to supplement domestic construction);
Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The International Law of the U.S. Supreme Court, 24
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 273, 325 (2006) (asserting that in cases implicating U.S. interest, the Court has
avoided international law but upheld its goals through broad interpretation of U.S. Constitutional
provisions).
30. Roper, 543 U.S. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I do not believe that approval by ‘other nations
and peoples’ should buttress our commitment to American principles any more than (what should
logically follow) disapproval by ‘other nations and peoples’ should weaken that commitment.”).
31. Cohen, supra note 29, at 273 (describing how after the Supreme Court’s citation of foreign law
in its opinion striking down juvenile death penalty, “[T]he halls of Congress seemed to shudder with
anger as congressmen and senators rushed to react.”). The Republican outcry has made an appearance in
Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings. Arizona Senator Jon Kyl responded
to Sotomayor’s past statement that courts should look at “good ideas” from foreign law by stating, “The
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assess the parameters of the Bush administration’s war on terror.
Here, political sides had been quickly drawn regarding constitutional
restraints on executive war-making power,32 with conservatives
generally arguing for unfettered or near limitless executive authority
and liberals favoring significant congressional and judicial
oversight.33 Lurking in the substrata of the various civil libertiesversus-national security debates was a bubbling political polarization
over the enforceability of international law. The Geneva
Conventions34 were arguably the greatest threat to the Bush
administration’s ability to wage the war on terror in any manner it
saw fit, even greater than the Constitution. There is very little
language in the Constitution regarding presidential war power, and
the principle that during war the President can bypass other
constitutional provisions is largely a creature of expert commentary
and sparse case law.35 Because the “law of war” is therefore extraconstitutional, it provided the Supreme Court a virtual tabula rasa

laws and practices of foreign nations are simply irrelevant to interpreting the will of the American
people as expressed through our Constitution.” Kate Phillips, Live Blogging the Sotomayor Hearings,
N.Y. TIMES: THE CAUCUS (July 13, 2009, 1:30 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/13/
live-blogging-the-sotomayor-hearings.
32. Interestingly, although some commentators object to the concept of a rhetorical “war” on terror,
see, e.g., Aya Gruber, Raising the Red Flag: The Continued Relevance of the Japanese Internment in the
Post-Hamdi World, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 307, 366 (2006) (arguing that treating counterterrorism activities
as legal “war” allows the government to “freely ignore the Constitution in any prosecution of alleged
terrorists”), the Court and public for the most part seem to accept that we are at “war” in some fashion.
See Detlev Vagts, Military Commissions: Constitutional Limits on Their Role in the War on Terror, 102
AM. J. INT’L L. 573, 580–81 (2008) (noting that Justices’ views range from considering the U.S. at war
with Taliban to viewing the U.S. as at war with “radical Islam”); cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
521 (2004) (“If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts
that informed the development of the law of war, [the war paradigm] may unravel. But that is not the
situation we face as of this date. Active combat operations against Taliban fighters apparently are
ongoing in Afghanistan.”).
33. Immediately after 9-11, even Democrats appeared deferential to President Bush. See Aya Gruber,
Who’s Afraid of Geneva Law?, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1017, 1021−27 (2007) (discussing the debate between
Bush supporters and internationalists).
34. Most of the arguments regarding the Guantánamo detainees were made under the Third Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
35. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 592 (2006). See generally Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H.
Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002)
(discussing only two Supreme Court cases as precedent for military tribunal).
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legal regime on which to scrawl its limitations (or non-limitations).36
Thus, the Bush administration could reasonably hope to exploit the
atmosphere of fear and hysteria surrounding September 11 in favor of
an expansive judicial reading of constitutional war power.37
By contrast, the Geneva Conventions lay out with clarity and great
specificity how governments must treat prisoners of war, civilians,
and others during times of armed conflict.38 The treaty accordingly
represented a significant potential restraint on how the Bush
administration could treat detained Afghan and al Qaeda fighters.
From the beginning, the Bush administration pursued a policy of
“lawyering” the Conventions39 and setting forth numerous textual
arguments, from specious to plausible, as to why they do not apply to
the Guantánamo detainees.40 It was obviously important for public
relations reasons that the administration find a way to convince the
36. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1062 (2003) (“Courts are able to apply an emergency-sensitive
interpretation to constitutional arrangements, structures, powers, and rights. Governmental powers may
expand, and the scope of rights protection may contract, so that the crisis can be met effectively.”).
37. White House counsel lawyers advocated for an interpretation of war powers that would permit
the President to bypass the Constitution, domestic legislation, and treaties. See, e.g., Memorandum from
John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., & Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes
II,
General
Counsel,
Dep’t
of
Def.
10–11
(Jan.
9,
2002),
available
at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy//documents/20011023.pdf (emphasizing President’s
uncontestable commander-in-chief powers); Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 34 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf
(asserting that Commander-in-Chief power overrides any limitations imposed by federal legislation and
Convention Against Torture); see Katyal & Tribe, supra note 35, at 1269 (“[T]he Bush Administration
has sought to convert the singular Commander-in-Chief Clause into a textual warrant for exceptional
unilateralism.”).
38. See also Jordan J. Paust, Suing Saddam: Private Remedies for War Crimes and Hostage-Taking,
31 VA. J. INT’L L. 351, 368 (1991) (observing that “it is difficult to imagine a more mandatory,
controlling, detailed, definable, universal, and useful set of treaty standards” than those in the Geneva
Conventions).
39. David Glazier, Full and Fair by What Measure?: Identifying the International Law Regulating
Military Commission Procedure, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 55, 119 (2006) (maintaining that Bush engaged in a
“‘hyper-technical legal analysis’ to exploit ambiguities” in the Geneva Conventions) (quoting Geoffrey
S. Corn, Op-Ed., When the Law of War Becomes Over-lawyered, JURIST, Nov. 25, 2005, available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2005/11/when-law-of-war-becomes-over-lawyered.php).
40. For example, the administration first argued that because the Taliban was an illegitimate
government, the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the Afghan conflict, but then it receded from that
argument. The administration also argued that laws of war do not apply to “unlawful” combatants and
made much of the fact that the Taliban fighters did not wear uniforms. For an overview of these
arguments, see Gruber, supra note 33, at 1023–24.
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public that it was in compliance with the Conventions,41 but in the
legal arena the administration advanced an argument for the
wholesale jettisoning of the Geneva Conventions in domestic courts:
“Non-self-execution.” The administration claimed simply that as nonself-executing treaties, the Geneva Conventions could not be
enforced by individuals in U.S. courts.42 In turn, the formerly
legalistic question of treaty execution became as highly politicized as
the civil liberties-versus-national security debate.
Of course, the question of treaty execution long predated the war
on terror. The status of treaties is mentioned in the very text of the
Constitution, in the Supremacy Clause, which declares that “all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”43 During the
early years of our republic, the fact of treaty supremacy was
relatively apolitical and apparently accepted.44 The period
immediately following World War II saw a flurry of international
legal activity and thrust the question of treaty supremacy into the
foreground.45 Since that time, there has been steadily growing
hostility in certain legal, academic, and political circles to the concept
that treaties created in part or whole by “foreign entities” are binding

41. See Media Note No. 2005/994 from U.S. Dep’t of State, Invitation to UN Special Rapporteurs to
Visit
Guantánamo
Bay
Detention
Facilities
(Oct.
28,
2005),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/55756.htm (“U.S. policy is to treat all detainees in accordance
with its international obligations and in a manner consistent with the principles of the Third Geneva
Convention.”); Memorandum from President Bush on the Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL
TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS app. C (2004) [hereinafter 2002 Bush Memo], available at
http://wid.ap.org/documents/iraq/040824finalreport.pdf.
42. See DEFENSE STATEMENT, supra note 22, at 19−20; Brief for Respondents at 9, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 460875 (asserting that the Geneva Conventions
are non-self-executing).
43. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
44. See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 764–66 (1988) [hereinafter
Paust, Self-Executing Treaties].
45. See David Golove, Human Rights Treaties and the U.S. Constitution, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 579,
585 (2002) (noting that post-World War II era saw “the birth of the modern human rights era”).
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domestic law.46 Although a topic of moderate activity in lower courts,
until the last few years the Supreme Court had said very little on the
issue and had not adopted the position that treaties are generally nonself-executing.47
It was upon this historical, political, and legal background that the
Supreme Court rendered its 2006 decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
invalidating Bush’s military tribunals because they violated the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).48 The decision caused a
feeling that can be fairly characterized as jubilation among
progressives and internationalists.49 Yale Law School dean and
international lawyer Harold Koh declared that the Hamdan case
“finally beg[a]n the much-needed process of turning the legal world
right-side up again.”50 International law scholar George Fletcher
dubbed Hamdan a new beginning for international law in the United
States.51 Perhaps, however, internationalists were advancing a
premature “mission accomplished” declaration. Upon further
examination, the Hamdan majority opinion is remarkable in its
46. See, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 21, at 326 (rejecting European-influenced law on ground
that “Europe has been given to fluctuations of ideological extremes” and in Europe “fascism and
communism, which were once viewed by some as advanced, modern ideologies, were adopted by
regimes that murdered millions”). See generally Gruber, supra note 33, at IV.B (discussing development
of anti-treaty ideology).
47. See David Sloss, When Do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court
Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez–Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 20, 101 (2006)
(observing that before World War II, the Court recognized presumption of treaty enforceability and after
said very little about it); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self–Executing Treaties, 89
AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 697–700, 722 (1995) [hereinafter Vázquez, Four Doctrines] (noting that the
Supreme Court “has not said more than a sentence or two about the distinction in any case for nearly a
century”).
48. Hamdan v. Rumsfield, 344 F.Supp.2d 152, 173 (D.D.C. 2004). See generally 10 U.S.C. § 801
(1950).
49. See Martin S. Flaherty, More Real than Apparent: Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law, and
Comparative Executive “Creativity” in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 2005–2006, at 51, 51
(“Rarely has the Supreme Court handed a ‘wartime’ president a greater defeat, or human rights
defenders a greater victory [as in Hamdan].”). Bush administration defenders considered the case an
agonizing defeat. David E. Sanger & Scott Shane, Court’s Ruling Is Likely to Force Negotiations over
Presidential Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2006, at A21 (quoting White House Counsel Bradford A.
Berenson as stating of Hamdan, “What is truly radical is the Supreme Court’s willingness to bend to
world opinion and undermine some of the most important foundations of American national security law
in the middle of a war.”).
50. Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2352 (2006).
51. See generally George P. Fletcher, The Hamdan Case and Conspiracy as a War Crime: A New
Beginning for International Law in the U.S., 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 442 (2006).
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judicial restraint. Although it invalidated Bush’s tribunals, it did so
on the narrow ground that they violate the UCMJ, a domestic statute
that was about to be superseded by the Military Commissions Act
(MCA).52 Hamdan did not pronounce any significant constitutional
limitations on presidential war power,53 nor did it reach the
overriding foreign relations question of treaty execution.54
Hamdan indeed would have been one of the greatest
internationalist victories had the Supreme Court been willing, after
nearly fifty years of silence, to recognize the force of international
law in the face of decades of growing post-World War II isolationism
that pinnacled after September 11. Unfortunately, the Court appeared
to fear weighing in on the issue and went to great lengths to stay mute
on whether the Geneva Conventions constitute valid domestic law.
The Hamdan majority’s refusal to comment on the status of the
Conventions left open a dangerous door for a divided Court, now
politically polarized over the treaty execution issue, to finally adopt
an isolationist stance toward treaty execution. This is the precise door
the Court walked through with its March 25, 2008 decision, Medellín
v. Texas.55 What started out as fear of international human rights law
in Hamdan went to loathing in Medellín, as the Court for the first
time formally sanctioned the United States’ ability to double deal in
international relations.56 But before discussing Medellín, two
52. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2601 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a).
53. For example, the Court avoided answering whether in cases of “controlling necessity,” the
President could unilaterally establish a military tribunal. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 592 (2005)
(“[Whether] the President may constitutionally convene military commissions ‘without the sanction of
Congress’ in cases of ‘controlling necessity’ is a question this Court . . . need not answer today.”). The
Court also did not require that tribunals be established by Congress, but merely asserted they could not
violate a pre-existing congressional limitation. Id. at 593 n.23 (“Whether or not the President has
independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not
disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his
powers.”). In addition, the Court did not rule out the possibility that the political branches acting
together could establish a standing war crime tribunal, although dicta reveal the majority’s concerns
with such a tribunal. Id. at 597−98 (noting that tribunal in Quirin represents “high water mark” of war
power and suggesting that establishing such tribunal outside “theater of war” does not comport with
common law) (quoting WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 831 (2d ed. 1920)).
54. Id. at 627−28 (assuming that the Geneva Conventions did not provide Hamdan with individually
enforceable rights).
55. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
56. Francisco Forrest Martin, The Constitution and Human Rights: The International Legal
Constructionist Approach to Ensuring the Protection of Human Rights, 1 FIU L. REV. 71, 85–86 (2006)
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preliminary questions call for examination. First, what is the status of
treaties in U.S. domestic law? Second, why was Hamdan’s approach
to the Geneva Conventions harmful to the Supreme Court’s
international reputation?
II. SELF-EXECUTING AND NON-SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES
The question of the status of treaties in domestic law is not unique
to the United States. Every signatory nation to a treaty must grapple
with the extent to which it will incorporate international law into its
national legal system. Experts have identified two predominant
approaches to the domestic application of treaty law: “dualist” and
“monist.”57 In dualist systems, like Great Britain, even if the country
signs a treaty guaranteeing individual rights, individuals have no
ability to enforce those rights unless Parliament passes a separate
domestic law “executing” the treaty.58 Thus, it is said that in dualist
systems, all treaties are non-self-executing.59 In other words, treaties
establish international obligations between nations but do not create
any obligations to individuals who are subjects of the treaty. To
illustrate, let us assume hypothetically that Britain and Japan signed a
treaty requiring both countries to allow each other’s citizens to work,
and a British city administrator denied a Japanese citizen’s
application for a business license. Under the British approach, in the
absence of ratifying domestic legislation, the Japanese person would
not be able to sue the city for violating his treaty rights.60 The concept
is that Britain has violated its treaty obligation to Japan but has not
violated the individual Japanese person’s right to work in Britain.
(characterizing non-self-execution as a “weapon” that permits the United States to be “an outlaw in the
international community” and engage in “double-dealing by, on the one hand, agreeing to be bound by a
treaty and, on the other hand, reserving the right to not give the treaty any effect”).
57. See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 97, 126 (2004).
58. Lord Templeman, Treaty-Making and the British Parliament, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 459,
481−83 (1991).
59. This language comes from Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 254 (1829), which is widely
considered the first case dealing with the domestic enforceability of treaties.
60. This essentially makes the agreement meaningless. For this reason, internationalists criticize the
dualist approach for allowing bad-faith treaty signing. See, e.g., Jinks & Sloss, supra note 57, at 124−25.
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The United States historically has followed a different practice. For
example, in 1924, the Supreme Court reviewed a case filed by a
Japanese citizen, Asakura, against the city of Seattle for denying him
a business license.61 Asakura alleged that such action was illegal, in
violation of a treaty between the United States and Japan.62 The
Supreme Court found that given the constitutional supremacy of
treaties, Asakura could enforce his treaty rights by suing Seattle
directly.63 The Court adopted a monist approach and refused to
require executing legislation, reasoning that the Supremacy Clause
gives treaties the status of federal statutory law.64 The bottom line is
that the Constitution makes treaties part of “our law.”
Unfortunately, over the years the water has been muddied with the
introduction of the self-execution doctrine. In a nutshell, the doctrine
divides treaties into two classes: self-executing treaties, which do not
require ratifying legislation to be enforceable, and non-self-executing
treaties, which do.65 Expert views on self-execution range from
extremely internationalist, like the opinion that rights-conferring
treaties are supreme over federal legislation,66 to extremely
isolationist, like the view that treaties by their nature do not have
domestic effect and Congress is largely without power to confer it.67
The conflict, however, is mostly between those who believe that
treaties are domestically enforceable, subject to ordinary interpretive
principles (what I will call the “internationalist approach”), and those
who believe that treaties are presumptively non-self-executing and
must pass difficult, if not impossible, legal hurdles to be enforceable
(what I will call the “exceptionalist approach”).

61. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
62. Id. at 340.
63. Id. at 341.
64. Id.; see also Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 254 (confirming that a “different principle” established by
the U.S. declares a “treaty to be the law of the land”).
65. See generally Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 47 (providing in-depth analysis of selfexecution doctrine).
66. See Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 406, 425–26
(1989) (positing that Framers intended treaties to be supreme over federal statutes).
67. John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original
Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2093–94 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism].
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The internationalist mantra is quite straightforward: Pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause, treaties should have the status of other federal
legislation. Thus, the interpretive rules governing whether federal
legislation creates justiciable rights or individual private rights of
action apply to treaties.68 If a treaty simply does not confer any rights
(for example, one that calls for future legislative action only) or does
not give rise to private lawsuits (for example, one that explicates a
uniquely international administrative remedy), it cannot be enforced
judicially. However, treaties that guarantee rights to individuals,
enforceable via internal or external private rights of action, are
judicially cognizable—just like federal legislative law.69 So when it
comes to the Geneva Conventions, the analysis is quite simple.
Geneva provides wartime detainees with a laundry list of individual
rights.70 There are several sources from which to derive Guantánamo
prisoners’ private right to enforce the Geneva Conventions, the most
obvious being the federal habeas corpus statute, which provides that
prisoners who are in custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States” may file a petition in federal court
seeking release.71 Therefore, Guantánamo detainees should be
permitted to challenge their detention on the ground that such custody
violates Geneva’s dictates.72
68. Thus, like with statutes, courts have an obligation to construe vague treaty terms rather than just
discarding treaties that merit interpretation. See Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 47, at 714.
69. Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained Without
Trial, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503, 515 (2003) (“Federal courts have repeatedly held that a treaty need only
expressly or impliedly provide an individual right for it to be self-enforcing.”).
70. E.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 34, arts. 5–7, 14, 84–85, 98, 105–06, 129–30.
71. 8 U.S.C. § 2241 (2008) (emphasis added).
72. Thus, the Geneva Conventions present a less complicated case than treaties that call on states to
implement specific provisions under their domestic statutes, like the Convention Against Torture. See
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A.
Res. 39/46, art. 4, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, at 197 (Dec. 10, 1984)
(“Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law.”). One could
imagine a situation in which a state party either fails to implement the treaty or the implementing
domestic statute falls short of the treaty’s mandate by, for example, defining torture more narrowly than
the treaty. Clearly, the state would be in violation of its treaty obligation. If an individual sues that state
for engaging in acts that constitute torture within the meaning of the treaty, but are lawful under
domestic law, there would be a thorny interpretive question regarding whether treaty drafters intended
individual litigants to be able to invoke the treaty rights directly. That is, however, not the case with the
Geneva Conventions. It does not call upon states to create legislation regarding the treatment of wartime detainees—it clearly binds states to treat detainees in a certain manner. See, e.g., Third Geneva
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The exceptionalist approach is not very simple because it is a
product of ongoing legal obfuscation73 and even manipulation.74 It is
important to understand what this approach enables. A rule that
nullifies treaties as domestic law allows the United States to sign
international human rights agreements and purport to support
individual rights, while simultaneously divesting those agreements of
any ability to actually give rights to individuals.75 Even worse, such a
rule makes old human rights and humanitarian treaties, which were
signed in good faith by past administrations, easy to ignore by future
administrations hostile to those rights.76 Indeed, the Bush
administration hid behind the cloak of non-self-execution in its
insistence that the Geneva Conventions did not provide individual
rights to the Guantánamo detainees.77
To trace the origin of the exceptionalist approach to self-execution,
one must go back to the 1829 case Foster v. Neilson, which involved
a dispute over land rights under a treaty between Spain and the
United States.78 In the treaty, the United States agreed that certain
land transfers that had occurred between Spain and individuals “shall
be ratified.”79 The Supreme Court, not wanting the transfers to be
Convention, supra note 34, art. 13 (“Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any
unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a
prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present
Convention.”).
73. See, e.g., Michael Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call for
Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1887 (2005) (calling modern treaty jurisprudence “a combination of
inattention and Supreme Court rhetorical ambiguity”); Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 47, at 722
(asserting that modern self-execution doctrine is a result of “sloppy reasoning and careless use of
precedent”).
74. Gruber, supra note 33, at 1065 (“[T]here is evidence that anti-internationalist hostility to treaty
law, tied to a more sinister desire to preserve racial hierarchy, constituted the driving force behind the
self-execution doctrine.”).
75. Jordan J. Paust, Avoiding “Fraudulent” Executive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1257, 1265 (1993).
76. See Gruber, supra note 33, at 1067 (asserting that the self-execution doctrine “creates a clever
insurmountable barrier to the domestic enforcement of treaties ratified prior to the creation of the
modern intent doctrine”).
77. See supra note 42.
78. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 253 (1829).
79. The treaty stated in pertinent part that “all the grants of land made before the 24th of January
1818, by his catholic majesty, & c. shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the
lands, to the same extent that the same grants would be valid if the territories had remained under the
dominion of his catholic majesty.” Id. at 276.
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legally
valid—some
say
for
political
and
racial
reasons80interpreted the “shall be ratified” phrase in an awkward
manner, an interpretation it soon reversed.81 The Court construed the
word “shall” as signifying that the United States had not intended to
validate the land transfers by the treaty, but only to promise that the
transfers would become valid if Congress passed a law ratifying the
transfers.82 The Court thus opined that when “parties [engage] to
perform a particular act . . . the legislature must execute the contract
before it can become a rule for the Court.”83 In essence, under the
Court’s interpretation, the U.S. promised Spain exactly nothing.
Realizing this, four years later the Court reinterpreted the treaty to
say that the treaty itself validated the land grants.84 However bad its
interpretation of the word “shall,” Foster’s principle is solid: an
individual simply cannot seek judicial remedy from a treaty that has
not conferred any individual rights. Today, however, Foster’s modest
proposition has spawned a line of cases holding that treaties are
generally non-self-executing and even a treaty clearly conferring
individual rights can be unenforceable.85
The evolution from Foster to the modern self-execution doctrine
occurred over decades, as the U.S. changed from a fledgling republic
to a world power, and international law and legal structures
underwent rapid development.86 In the years following Foster, the
Court continued to view treaties as valid federal law, enforcing those
that contained justiciable provisions,87 and only refusing to allow
80. See, e.g., Henry J. Richardson III, Excluding Race Strategies from International Legal History:
The Self-Executing Treaty Doctrine and the Southern Africa Tripartite Agreement, 45 VILL. L. REV.
1091, 1109 (2000) (contending that Foster was “born out of judicial deference to the fruits of military
conquest, as redefined through congressional statutory arrangements for white occupation and land
ownership”).
81. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 69 (1833) (reversing Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
253 (1820)).
82. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314–15.
83. Id. at 314.
84. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 69.
85. See infra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
86. See Gruber, supra note 33, at 1070–71; Golove, supra note 45, at 585–87 (discussing selfexecution in historical context).
87. See Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 44, at 766 (characterizing self-execution doctrine
as a judicial invention and noting that after Foster, Court continued to enforce treaties as supreme law).
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individual lawsuits when the treaties clearly created solely
“horizontal” obligations between nations.88 But with World War II
came the birth of the international human rights era, including the
United States’ ratification of the United Nations Charter (U.N.
Charter) and consideration of the Genocide Convention. These
international instruments had the potential to significantly impact the
American legal landscape.
One California court of appeals case, Sei Fujii v. State,89 and some
U.S. Supreme Court concurring opinions in Oyama v. California90
relied on the U.N. Charter to strike down the racially discriminatory
Alien Land Law.91 These cases were enough to concern conservative
politicians that international law might spell an end to southern racial
segregation. In 1951, Republican senator John Bricker introduced a
draft constitutional amendment (dubbed the “Bricker Amendment”)
to make all treaties unenforceable in the absence of implementing
legislation.92 Rather than admit to the underlying segregationist
purpose, “Brickerites” defended the Amendment as compelled by the
principle of American domestic sovereignty. One supporter stated
that the Amendment marked the “line . . . between those Americans
who believe in the preservation of national sovereignty . . . and those
who believe that our national independence . . . should yield to . . .
some kind of world authority.”93 The Bricker Amendment eventually
failed to pass, and Bricker abandoned his efforts after securing

See, e.g., Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 488 (1879); Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
366, 372 (1856); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 592 (1832).
88. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598–99 (1884).
89. Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481, 488 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (“The Alien Land Law must . . .
yield to the treaty as the superior authority.”).
90. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649–50 (1948) (Black, J., concurring) (“[H]ow can this
nation be faithful to this international pledge if state laws which bar land ownership and occupancy by
aliens on account of race are permitted to be enforced?”); id. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring)
(“[I]nconsistency with the [U.N.] Charter . . . is but one more reason why the statute must be
condemned.”).
91. The Alien Land Law, 1 Cal. Gen. Laws, Act 261 (Deering 1944, 1945 Supp.), prohibited people
who were “ineligible” for citizenship, specifically Japanese persons, to own land.
92. There were several versions of the amendment, but the basic premise of the amendment was to
ensure that “[a] treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation
which would be valid in the absence of a treaty.” S. REP. NO. 83-412, at 1 (1953).
93. See, e.g., FRANK E. HOLMAN, STORY OF THE “BRICKER” AMENDMENT 22 (1954).
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assurances from the White House that the President would not sign
the Genocide Convention.94
This historical moment demonstrates how the self-execution
doctrine has long been a vehicle of exceptionalism, permitting
America to condemn human rights violations abroad, while
segregating lunch counters at home.95 The Bricker moment signaled
to conservative jurists that stirring up fears over sovereignty and the
dangers of the importation of “foreign moods, fads, or fashions”96
could be a good method of stemming the forward movement of the
liberal rights agenda.97 After the Bricker era, often warning of the
significant “costs” of human rights litigation,98 lower courts started to
chip away at the influence of international law by erecting doctrinal
hurdles to treaty enforceability.99
Among other things, courts began to require specific language on
domestic enforceability or other evidence of drafter intent regarding
self-execution before finding a treaty enforceable.100 Such legal
maneuvers to thwart treaty law might seem facially reasonable, but
upon further examination, they are quite unsound. These courts do
not determine enforceability by analyzing whether the treaty creates
94. Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89
AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 348–49 (1995).
95. See Richardson, supra note 80, at 1117 (“[H]istorical symmetry between the [self-execution]
Doctrine having been born to uphold a government policy of racial conquest, and the Doctrine’s present
status of being consistently used by the judiciary and political branches to bar people of color, in a
context of continuing American racism, from invoking the full width of human rights to which they are
entitled for protection.”). Harold Koh notes that today the United States has adopted “the perverse
practice of human rights compliance without ratification.” Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword: On American
Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1484 (2003). It is likely, however, that Bricker would have
preferred the United States not sign any human rights treaties in the first place. Today, it is popular for
politicians on both sides of the aisle to support international human rights regimes, so long as they can
set their condemnatory sights on “bad” non-Western nations like China and Sudan.
96. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002).
97. Resnik, supra note 12, at 1606 (“The arguments . . . are remarkably congruent over time: that
transnational human rights conventions threaten American sovereignty, states’ prerogatives, and the
domestic order established therein.”).
98. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 n.16, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring).
99. Gruber, supra note 33, at 1050–55 (discussing lower court constructions of self-execution
doctrine). See generally Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 47.
100. Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Yoo, Globalism,
supra note 67, at 2090–91 (asserting that a treaty is non-self-executing unless “the text clearly indicates
judicial enforcement”).
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concrete rights and obligations, but rather they look for some extra
evidence that drafters intended domestic enforceability.101 This is
akin to a court refusing to enforce federal legislation without some
provision stating, “And we really mean it.”102 Lower courts have set
up other barriers to treaty enforcement, like the presumption that
treaties create only obligations between nations and do not create
individual rights103 and the requirement that self-executing treaties
contain express judicial remedy provisions.104 The feather in the
treaty exceptionalist’s cap is that the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law now accepts the view that treaties are not judicially
enforceable unless there is evidence that the drafters intended selfexecution.105
This is not to say that the self-execution doctrine is merely a cover
for racial oppression and the denial of human rights. Those who
support the doctrine are honestly and deeply concerned with the issue
of domestic sovereignty. Although sovereigntist anxiety over the

101. See, e.g., Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452, 1463 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (finding
Geneva Conventions non-self-executing, despite language in commentaries supporting domestic
enforcement, because there was “no language to this effect within the agreement itself”).
102. Gruber, supra note 33, at 1067 (asserting that using Foster as grounds for creating self-execution
doctrine is as “untenable as using a routine statutory or contract interpretation case that refuses to
implement vague terms as a basis for requiring specific language in all statutes and contracts that the
documents are really enforceable”). Even courts that predicate non-self-execution on evidence that
treaty makers desired domestic unenforceability tend to reason in an ad hoc manner that would be
absurd in other legal interpretation contexts. For example, courts often derive such intent from the postratification of individual members of Congress. See, e.g., United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 881–82
(5th Cir. 1979) (finding intent against self-execution in part from statements of individual senator);
Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 371 F.2d 154, 157 (7th Cir. 1967) (relying on post-ratification statement of
Attorney General). It would be hard to imagine a court refusing to enforce a contract between, say,
several corporations because one board member said after the fact he would not abide by the contract.
103. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying presumption of
unenforceability to Geneva Conventions).
104. Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2003); Bannerman v. Snyder, 325 F.3d 722, 724
(6th Cir. 2003) (habeas statute only applies to self-executing treaties). However, “where federally
protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 cmt. h
(1987) (“[T]he intention of the United States determines whether an agreement is to be self-executing in
the United States.”). It also seems to adopt the presumption of non-self-execution view because it
implies that the only way for a treaty to be self-executing is for it to overlap with pre-existing domestic
legislation “adequate to enable the United States to carry out its obligations.” Id.
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nefarious influence of “world courts”106 is often difficult to
disentangle from xenophobia, racially-influenced nationalism, or the
preservation of conservative cultural hegemony, even the most leftleaning scholar would agree that international law should not displace
all domestic law. The exceptionalist approach to self-execution,
however, is simply not required to prevent international law from
“taking over.”107 Our constitutional structure already contains many
mechanisms to preserve sovereignty. For example, under the “last-intime rule,” Congress has the option to pass domestic legislation
abrogating a treaty.108 Moreover, the executive retains the political
option to withdraw from treaties.109 What the self-execution doctrine
adds is the government’s ability to ratify human rights treaties,
creating the appearance of respect for human rights, and violate those
rights without domestic legal liability.110 One wonders whether
Congress would have supported the Guantánamo detentions if, in
order to do so, it had to pass legislation specifically repealing the
venerable Geneva Conventions.111
Historically, the Supreme Court never jumped on the selfexecution bandwagon, despite the flurry of activity in lower courts. In
the nearly two centuries between Foster and Hamdan, the Court ruled
in a number of treaty cases, almost always finding the treaty at issue
self-executing without regard to specific language on domestic
enforceability and without requiring particular evidence of drafter

106. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347–48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for
taking into account “the practices of the ‘world community,’ whose notions of justice are (thankfully)
not always those of our people”).
107. Cf. John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-SelfExecution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2236 (1999) (“[I]f the United States forges multilateral agreements
addressing problems that were once domestic in scope, treaties could replace legislation as a vehicle for
domestic regulation.”).
108. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
109. For example, after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found the United States to be in
violation of its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in the Avena case, see
infra notes 140–144 and accompanying text, the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol to
the Convention, which requires Vienna claims to be submitted to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 500 (2008).
110. This is classic exceptionalism. See supra note 12.
111. See Gruber, supra note 33, at 1064 (“[Congress] would likely have been exceedingly reluctant to
repeal explicitly a treaty as important and widely-publicized as the Geneva Conventions.”).
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intent regarding self-execution.112 Justice Breyer sums up the prior
Supreme Court treaty cases as recognizing: “(1) a treaty obligated the
United States to treat foreign nationals in a certain manner; (2) the
obligation had been breached by the Government’s conduct; and (3)
the foreign national could therefore seek redress for that breach in a
judicial proceeding, even though the treaty did not specifically
mention judicial enforcement.”113 The question then becomes: Did
the Supreme Court have other valid reasons for exercising restraint
on the Geneva enforceability issue in Hamdan? A careful
examination of Hamdan’s claims for relief and the interpretive
analysis warrant an answer in the negative.
III. LEAVING THE SELF-EXECUTION DOOR OPEN IN HAMDAN V.
RUMSFELD
Hamdan had precisely argued that his Geneva rights were being
violated by Bush’s military tribunal process and requested the Court
to enforce his rights by transferring him to a court martial or civilian
court.114 The most natural course of action would have been for the
Court to engage a simple two-step inquiry: (1) Do the detainees have
enforceable rights under the Geneva Conventions; and (2) were these
rights violated?115 In fact, one of the two “questions presented” to the
Court in Hamdan’s brief was “[w]hether Petitioner and others
similarly situated can obtain judicial enforcement from an Article III
court of rights protected under the 1949 Geneva Convention in an
action for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of their
detention by the Executive branch?”116 Ignoring that threshold
question all together, the Court elected to address only whether the
112. See David Sloss, When Do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court
Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez-Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 20, 88 (2006) (“[T]he
Supreme Court has never applied the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties to deny a remedy to an
individual whose treaty rights were violated.”).
113. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 375 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
114. Brief for Petitioner at 8, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184).
115. This is precisely the way the district court addressed the issue. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.
Supp. 2d 152, 158−72 (D.D.C. 2004).
116. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 114, at i.
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tribunals substantively violated the Geneva Conventions. It did so
incidentally in a very internationalist manner.
Hamdan decisively rejected the Bush administration’s assertion
that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions does not apply to
Guantánamo detainees.117 Common Article 3 is a catch-all provision
requiring that detainees in conflicts “not of an international
character” be afforded basic humane treatment, including the right to
be tried by a “regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.”118 The Bush administration had asserted that the term “not
of an international character” meant that the provision could not
apply to the “international” war between the United States and al
Qaeda.119 The Supreme Court refused to defer to the executive’s
interpretation120 and instead construed “international” as meaning
“between nations.”121 The Court adopted the view that the Geneva
Conventions provide a comprehensive regime for regulating armed
conflict, and Common Article 3 excludes only conflicts between
party nations because such conflicts are covered elsewhere in the

117. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 632−35.
118. The provision is called a “common article” because it appears in all four Geneva Conventions. It
provides in pertinent part:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as
a minimum, the following provisions:
....
. . . [T]he passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 34, art. 3.
119. 2002 Bush Memo, supra note 41; see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630 (noting the government’s
argument).
120. In another internationalist move, the Court simply ignored the body of case law indicating that
courts should give “great weight” to the executive’s “reasonable” interpretation of a treaty, a doctrine
the Court had invoked just the day before in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 355 (2006)
(“[W]hile courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the departments of
government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight.” (quoting
Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961))). See generally Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating
Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723 (2007)
(analyzing approaches to deference in treaty interpretation).
121. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2005) (“The term ‘conflict not of an international
character’ is used here in contradistinction to a conflict between nations.”).
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Conventions.122 The Court concluded that Bush’s military tribunals,
primarily because they were not authorized by Congress but also
because they lacked certain procedural protections, failed to comport
with Common Article 3’s requirement of a “regularly constituted
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.”123 Amazingly, the Court was
able to invalidate the tribunals on Geneva grounds without addressing
the issue of whether the detainees had enforceable Geneva rights in
the first place.
So how was it possible that the Supreme Court found the tribunals
to violate Geneva and struck them down, while simultaneously
avoiding the question of whether Geneva-based claims are judicially
cognizable? Justice Stevens cleverly but unfortunately did
interpretive gymnastics to attain this result. The Court asserted that
Common Article 3 applied to Hamdan, not because the Geneva
Conventions are a valid source of enforceable rights, but because
Common Article 3 is silently incorporated by domestic legislation,
specifically the UCMJ.124 The UCMJ actually does not mention the
Geneva Conventions and only briefly speaks of international law.
Article 21 of the UCMJ states:
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon
courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost
courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with
respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of
war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or
other military tribunals.125

The Court interpreted this provision as a domestic statutory
requirement that Bush’s tribunals comport with international law,

122. Id. at 630–31.
123. Id. at 630–35 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. 135).
124. Id. at 627–28.
125. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2006).
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including Common Article 3.126 Essentially, the Court treats the
UCMJ as “executing” legislation. The problem with the Court’s
analysis is that the legislative history of and expert consensus on
Article 21 do not support this conclusion. Historians are in fair
agreement that Article 21, whose predecessor provision was passed
long before the Geneva Conventions, was meant only to ensure that
the UCMJ’s creation of military courts martial would not alter the
President’s pre-existing authority to convene executive wartime
tribunals.127 It was not meant to require such tribunals to comport
with the laws of war.
The Supreme Court chose to give detainees Geneva rights by
reading them into a domestic statute that had little to do with the
treaty. Moreover, the Court knew that Congress was about to pass the
Military Commissions Act (MCA), which expressly replaces the
UCMJ where inconsistent.128 This Act is essentially a congressional
stamp of approval on Bush’s military tribunal process.129 Although its
tribunal procedures differ from those of Bush’s tribunals only
slightly,130 the MCA states both that it fulfills any requirements of
Common Article 3,131 and detainees subject to military trial may not

126. In a single conclusory statement, the Court characterizes the UCMJ as “preserv[ing] what power,
under the Constitution and the common law of war, the President had had before 1916 to convene
military commissions—with the express condition that the President and those under his command
comply with the law of war.” Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593 (emphasis added).
127. Scott L. Silliman, On Military Commissions, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 529, 535 (2005)
(“[T]he word ‘recognized’ is key to an accurate understanding [of Article 21] because it implies only
acknowledgment, not establishment.”); David Stoelting, Military Commissions and Terrorism, 31
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 427, 429 (2003) (asserting that Article 21 does not authorize tribunals but
rather “simply preserves the well–established jurisdiction of military commissions over crimes as
established by statute or by the laws of war”).
128. 10 U.S.C. § 948b(d) (2006).
129. M. Elizabeth Magill, Can Process Cure Substance? A Response to Neal Katyal’s “Internal
Separation of Powers,” 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 126, 129 (2006), available at
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/executive-power/can-process-curesubstance?-a-response-to-neal-katyal%26%238217;s-%26%238220;internal-separation-ofpowers%26%238221 (“[MCA] substantially follows the President’s pre-Hamdan conception of military
commissions.”).
130. See Gruber, supra note 33, at 1058–64 (comparing MCA to Bush’s tribunals).
131. 10 U.S.C. § 948b(f) (2006) (“A military commission established under this chapter is a regularly
constituted court, affording all the necessary ‘judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable
by civilized peoples’ for purposes of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.”).
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invoke the Geneva Conventions in litigation.132 Thus, any
international law-like protection culled from UCMJ would be shortlived and soon replaced by the MCA’s contempt for international
law.
As a consequence, although Hamdan might be seen as a liberal
victory because it used the Geneva Conventions to give detainees
greater rights, the case proved far less momentous as an indicator of
the United States’ participation in a worldwide human rights regime.
To the contrary, the Court deliberately chose to refrain from
stemming the tide of anti-internationalism in American treaty
jurisprudence, even though a statement on the status of treaties
appeared by every indication warranted, if not required.
It is difficult to say why the majority chose to secure Geneva rights
through the UCMJ rather than addressing the self-execution issue
head on. Perhaps there were not enough votes supporting Geneva
enforceability, and the majority wanted to render immediate relief to
the detainees. It could be that the majority feared prompting a
presidential withdrawal from or congressional repeal of the Geneva
Conventions. Maybe the Court’s silence on treaty status was merely
overprotective but misguided judicial restraint. Attempting to
discover the inner motivations of the justices is the province of Court
historians and biographers. Nonetheless, as Professor Jordan Paust
points out, “every violation of the laws of war is a war crime” and
“such caution in the face of international crime is less than
satisfying.”133 The “liberal” Hamdan majority certainly did not take
the opportunity to affirm the status of treaties in a time when an
understanding and acceptance of the international laws of war were
more important than ever. This oversight paved the way for the single
most exceptionalist Supreme Court treaty decision in history,
Medellín v. Texas.134

132. Id. § 948b(g) (“No alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military commission
under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights.”).
133. Paust, Mixed Record, supra note 29, at 841.
134. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), stay of execution denied, 129 S.Ct. 360 (2008).
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IV. WALKING THROUGH THE DOOR IN MEDELLÍN V. TEXAS
Medellín is the Supreme Court’s “first case ever to deny relief
solely on the ground that the treaty relied upon was non-selfexecuting.”135 Medellín is the ultimate in a series of cases involving
the United States’ violation of foreign nationals’ rights under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention).136
The Vienna Convention, to which the United States is a party,
guarantees foreign nationals arrested in signatory countries the right
to meet with consular officials.137 The petitioner Medellín, a Mexican
national, was arrested for murder in Texas. State officials did not
afford Medellín the opportunity to confer with Mexican consular
officials, and a Texas jury eventually convicted and sentenced him to
death.138 Medellín raised the issue of Texas’s violation of the Vienna
Convention in his state habeas corpus appeal. The state court
dismissed the habeas appeal on procedural default grounds because
Medellín had not raised the Vienna Convention issue in a timely
manner during trial or direct appeal.139
The United States Supreme Court had first ruled on the procedural
default question in the 1998 case Breard v. Greene, holding that
habeas petitioners’ Vienna Convention claims are subject to the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA)
procedural rules, just like all other habeas claims. The per curiam
opinion contains language tending to indicate that the authors
considered the Vienna Convention to confer enforceable rights. It
states:

135. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial
Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 601 (2008) [hereinafter Vázquez, Law of the Land].
136. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 352−353 (2006) (affirming Breard holding
despite intervening contrary judgments by ICJ); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375−76 (1998)
(holding that even assuming Vienna Convention is self-executing, petitioner’s claim of violation was
barred because of procedural default in state habeas proceedings).
137. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963,
T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
138. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 500–05.
139. Id.
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[A]lthough treaties are recognized by our Constitution as the
supreme law of the land, that status is no less true of provisions
of the Constitution itself, to which rules of procedural default
apply . . . . The Vienna Convention—which arguably confers on
an individual the right to consular assistance following arrest—
has continuously been in effect since 1969. But in 1996, before
Breard filed his habeas petition raising claims under the Vienna
Convention, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act . . . . Breard’s ability to obtain relief based on
violations of the Vienna Convention is subject to this
subsequently enacted rule, just as any claim arising under the
United States Constitution would be.140

After Breard, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) ruled in
two separate cases, the 2001 LaGrand Case (involving a German
national)141 and 2004 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Avena),142 that subjecting the Vienna Convention’s
requirements to AEDPA’s procedural default rules violates the terms
of the Convention. In Avena, the ICJ ordered the United States to
conduct special hearings to determine whether the named Mexican
nationals had been prejudiced by the Vienna Convention violation.143
After Avena, President Bush issued a memorandum that the United
States “[would] discharge its international obligations” under Avena
“by having State courts give effect to the decision.”144
In 2006, the Court in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon re-affirmed
Breard’s procedural default holding in the face of the contrary ICJ
decisions.145 The Court asserted that it would give the ICJ opinions
no more deference than “respectful consideration,” which did not

140. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376. The claim that a self-executing treaty is subject to state procedural
default rules has engendered its own critique. See, e.g., Quigley, supra note 4, at 677.
141. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
142. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31)
[hereinafter Avena].
143. Id.
144. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 503.
145. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
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compel a reversal of Breard.146 The political landscape and
composition of the Court, which was now in the midst of sorting
through the war on terror debate,147 had changed considerably since
1998. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court evidences much
more caution on the issue of treaty enforceability. The opinion notes
that the government “strongly dispute[s]” that the Vienna Convention
is self-executing and emphasizes the government’s position that
treaties are presumptively non-self executing.148 Tellingly, the Court
repeats the government’s selective quotation of an 1884 Supreme
Court decision, Head Money Cases, for the proposition that a treaty
“is primarily a compact between independent nations” and “depends
for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of
the governments which are parties to it.”149 The Court does not
mention other language from the case, often ignored by treaty
exceptionalists, which states that a treaty may “prescribe a rule by
which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined,”
and a “court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case
before it as it would to a statute.”150
Medellín’s case was not rendered moot by the holding in SanchezLlamas, because unlike the defendants in that case, he was one of the
individuals named in Avena. As a consequence, his argument was not
about Supreme Court deference to ICJ interpretation of the Vienna
Convention, but was about whether state officials were obligated to
give effect to the ICJ judgment and grant the named individuals
hearings.151 Medellín advanced two arguments in favor of
enforcement: (1) Texas had an obligation to comply with treaties that
require the United States to implement ICJ judgments; and (2) Texas

146. Id. at 353.
147. The Sanchez-Llamas opinion was issued the day before Hamdan.
148. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S, at 343 (citing Brief for United States at 11, Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S.
331 (2006) (No. 04-10566)).
149. Id. (quoting Brief for United States at 11, Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (No. 0410566)).
150. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884).
151. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008).
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had an obligation to comply with the President’s memorandum.152 Of
concern here is the Court’s analysis of Medellín’s first claim.
Chief Justice Roberts once again wrote the opinion of the Court,
and noted as a threshold matter that Texas would have to comply
with the judgment if Avena constituted “binding federal law” that
could be invoked as a source of substantive rights.153 The United
States is a signatory to two conventions that bear on the question of
the force of the Avena ruling. The Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention (Optional Protocol) provides that disputes regarding
Convention interpretation fall under the “compulsory jurisdiction” of
the ICJ.154 The United Nations Charter requires signatory nations to
“undertake[] to comply” with ICJ rulings.155 The Court found that
neither of these agreements required Texas to comply with Avena.156
The Court’s analysis begins with the division between
domestically enforceable self-executing treaties and unenforceable
non-self-executing treaties.157 Again, such a division is acceptable to
internationalists so long as non-self-executing treaties are confined to
those that do not create individual rights or expressly forbid private
lawsuits. Justice Roberts’s version of the division, however, seems to
be an exceptionalist one, for he quickly forays into the land of
presumptions against enforceability. As was foreshadowed by
Sanchez-Llamas, he begins with the selected quote from the Head
Money Cases, adding “of course” a treaty is “primarily a compact
between independent nations.”158 Roberts, however, does include the
language from Head Money Cases that self-executing treaties “have
the force and effect of a legislative enactment.”159 It is, therefore, not
entirely clear from this language whether the Court endorses the view

152. Id. at 503–04.
153. Id. at 504.
154. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art. I, Apr. 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487.
155. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1.
156. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 511.
157. Id. at 504–05.
158. Id. at 505 (quoting Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884)) (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 505–06 (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)).
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that treaties are presumptively non-self-executing and what the
formula is for overcoming such a presumption.
In a footnote, the Court makes this curious statement: “Even when
treaties are self-executing in the sense that they create federal law, the
background presumption is that ‘[i]nternational agreements, even
those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create
private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic
courts.’”160 The Court thus indicates that, in order to be enforced,
treaties must pass two separate hurdles:161 (1) they must meet a selfexecution test (whatever that may be); and (2) they must contain
“express language” that private individuals can sue to remedy
violations.162 However, the Court does not apply the express private
right of action requirement it apparently endorses. The Court could
have disposed of Medellín’s claim simply by saying that neither of
the treaties involved specified that individuals have a right to sue in
national courts to force compliance with ICJ decisions. Instead, the
Court’s limited discussions of standing invoke the statutory structure
of the ICJ and U.N. Charter language, rather than the absence of
express right-to-sue provisions. One argument asserts the ICJ statute
expressly prohibits non-parties (the technical parties to Avena were
the U.S. and Mexico) from seeking to enforce judgments.163 The
other posits that the U.N. Charter’s “sole remedy” for a breach is
U.N. Security Council action.164 Of course, there are strong
objections to the contention that whenever a treaty specifies an
international remedy it means to forbid domestic enforcement.165
160. Id. at 506 n.3 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 907).
161. Id. at 547−49 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing opinion for “erect[ing] legalistic hurdles that
can threaten” the application of existing treaties and negotiations of new ones).
162. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506 n.3 (citing approvingly the presumption that “treaties do not create
privately enforceable rights in the absence of express language to the contrary”).
163. Id. at 511–12 (“Article 59 of the statute provides that ‘[t]he decision of the [ICJ] has no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.’”).
164. Id. at 492.
165. The argument is that the fact that a treaty contains international remedial procedures but leaves
out domestic ones does not indicate that the treaty intended to make international remedies exclusive. A
treaty is an appropriate place to set forth a single uniform international remedy, but it would be unwieldy
and unwise for a multilateral treaty that involves multiple nations with differing legal systems to
prescribe domestic processes. Id. at 548 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[G]iven the differences among nations,
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Nevertheless, the Court stops far short of applying the express private
right of action rule it appears to support.
Turning back to self-execution, the Court indicates that the selfexecution inquiry is separate from the private right of action query.
The question thus becomes exactly what constitutes Medellín’s test
for self-execution. The major ambiguity in Medellín, and thus its
saving grace for internationalists, is its failure to distinguish between
two concepts of unenforceability: (1) the idea that a treaty is non-selfexecuting if, by it terms, it does not create any justiciable rights or
obligations; and (2) the concept that a treaty is non-self-executing
even if it does create concrete rights or obligations but does not
contain language indicating that the drafters intended “domestic
effect.”166 The majority opinion contains some language tending to
endorse the second view. It states, “[W]e have held treaties to be selfexecuting when the textual provisions indicate that the President and
Senate intended for the agreement to have domestic effect.”167
Similar to its standing analysis, however, the Court does not apply
the intent test it seems to support and instead focuses on
demonstrating that the Optional Protocol and U.N. Charter
substantively do not require the U.S. to implement the Avena ruling.
The case would have been much worse for internationalists had the
Court found that the Optional Protocol and U.N. Charter provisions
clearly obligated the U.S. (and Texas) to comply immediately with
the ICJ judgment, but Medellín could not sue to enforce the
obligation because U.S. treaty makers had not intended the provisions
to be domestically enforceable.168 Instead, what the Medellín majority
why would drafters write treaty language stating that a provision about, say, alien property inheritance,
is self-executing? How could those drafters achieve agreement when one signatory nation follows one
tradition and a second follows another?”).
166. Id. at 549 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that in determining self-execution, treaty text “matters
very much” but “not because it contains language that explicitly refers to self-execution”). Justice
Breyer further opines that drafting history is relevant to determine what the substantive obligations in
the treaty are but that courts should not try to discover some intent to self-execute. Id.
167. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 519; see also Brief for United States at 5, Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. 331
(2006) (No. 04-10566) (asserting that a treaty would be non-self-executing if it were “ratified without
provisions clearly according it domestic effect”).
168. The dissent apparently interprets the majority provision as doing precisely this. Medellín, 552
U.S. at 547 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (calling it “misguided” that the “majority looks for language about
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did was interpret the scope of the substantive obligations contained
within the Optional Protocol and U.N. Charter. The Court held that
the Optional Protocol’s directive that parties “submit” to the
“compulsory” authority of the ICJ only requires signatories to send
cases to the ICJ and appear for hearings, but it does not require actual
compliance with ICJ judgments.169 Regarding the U.N. Charter, the
Court opined that “undertake[] to comply” only signifies that parties
like the United States “pledged” their “faith” to one day create legal
structures to enforce ICJ judgments.170 In essence, Justice Roberts
makes the same questionable interpretive move as the Foster Court
did when interpreting the Spanish treaty. The Medellín majority’s
analysis renders the U.N. Charter language on ICJ judgments
basically meaningless because it does not actually bind the
signatories to comply with ICJ judgments.171 Questionable as the
interpretive analysis may be, it does not simply discard the treaty
provisions because there is no language on self-execution.
However, at the tail end of the opinion, the Court again shifts into
exceptionalist mode and concludes that “while the ICJ’s judgment in
Avena creates an international law obligation on the part of the
United States, it does not of its own force constitute binding federal
law.”172 Yet given its interpretive analysis, it is hard to understand
exactly what international obligation the United States has, since
“undertak[ing] to comply” does not mean compliance.173 The bottom
line is that, despite catch phrases to the contrary, the Court resolves
Medellín’s claims for relief on the ground that the Optional Protocol
and U.N. Charter simply do not create the substantive duties Medellín
claimed. Thus, despite any disagreement with Roberts’s

‘self-execution’ in the treaty itself and . . . erects ‘clear statement’ presumptions designed to help find an
answer”).
169. Id. at 508.
170. Id. (asserting that the Charter “does not provide that the United States ‘shall’ or ‘must’ comply
with an ICJ decision”).
171. See supra notes 153−55 and accompanying text.
172. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 523.
173. This interpretation clearly gives the United States a “get out of ICJ judgment free card,” again
signaling U.S. aversion to international law. It was also unnecessary given that the U.S. had withdrawn
from the Optional Protocol after Avena. See supra note 109.
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interpretation of treaty text,174 an internationalist might see an
optimistic aspect of the Court’s self-execution analysis.175 Medellín
leaves some room to argue that what the Court meant by non-selfexecuting is simply that the treaty at issue does not create rights and
obligations.176 Perhaps, the argument can still be made that a treaty
that clearly grants individuals rights, like the Geneva Conventions, is
by its very nature self-executing.177
V. A SECOND CHANCE FOR THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
It appears likely that the Supreme Court will not rule on the
domestic enforceability of the Geneva Conventions any time soon.
Congress, through the MCA, has now set forth specific processes
governing military trials of “alien unlawful combatants.” These
tribunals obviously comply with any constitutional mandate that
military tribunals be established by both political branches of
government.178 The fact that Congress has approved the tribunals also

174. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 534 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority’s interpretation of
“undertake to comply”); see also Vázquez, Law of the Land, supra note 135, at 661 (“In international
law usage, an ‘undertaking’ is well recognized to be a hard, immediate obligation.”).
175. For example, Professor Vazquez asserts:
Fortunately, the opinion supports an alternative reading, under which Medellín can be
understood to have found the relevant treaty to be non-self-executing because the
obligation it imposed required the exercise of nonjudicial discretion. So read, Medellín is
an example of an entirely distinct form of non-self-execution, and is thus consistent with
. . . a presumption that treaties are self-executing in the Foster sense.
Vázquez, Law of the Land, supra note 135, at 608.
176. This would be interpreting the majority opinion to mean what Justice Stevens’s concurring
opinion states. Justice Stevens opines:
I agree that the text and history of the Supremacy Clause, as well as this Court’s treatyrelated cases, do not support a presumption against self-execution. (citation omitted) I
also endorse the proposition that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is itself
self-executing and judicially enforceable. Moreover, I think this case presents a closer
question than the Court’s opinion allows. In the end, however, I am persuaded that the
relevant treaties do not authorize this Court to enforce the judgment of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals.
Medellín, 552 U.S. at 533 (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
177. There is still, however, the private right of action hurdle that the Court seemed to endorse. See
supra notes 160–65 and accompanying text. Such a rule would prevent enforcement of the Conventions
even via habeas corpus. See supra note 104.
178. Again, Hamdan did not go so far as to require this, but at least required that such tribunals not
violate a pre-existing Congressional limitation. See supra note 53. There is a possibility, however, that
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helps to satisfy Common Article 3’s requirement of a “regularly
constituted court.” Indeed, the MCA proclaims itself to be in
compliance with Common Article 3.179 Experts, however, argue that
in fact many of the procedures in the MCA are incompatible with
Common Article 3’s requirement that courts provide “all the judicial
guarantees [which are] recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.”180 Conceivably, then, a detainee subject to military trial
under the MCA could assert that his Geneva rights are being violated.
If such a case were to arrive at the Supreme Court, the Court would
not be able to “backdoor” the Geneva Conventions through UCMJ
Article 21, as it did in Hamdan, because the MCA expressly replaces
the UCMJ where inconsistent.181 Thus, in order to enforce such a
detainee’s Geneva rights, the Court would have to decide the selfexecution question.
Of course, the Supreme Court might simply find that the MCA
complies with Common Article 3, rendering a decision on selfexecution unnecessary, or strike down the tribunals on domestic
grounds. Moreover, it could possibly bypass the self-execution
question all together by holding that the MCA replaced contrary
Geneva provisions as a “last-in-time” statute.182 However, courts
generally look for clear language before finding that a treaty has been
superseded by statute.183 Although the MCA does seek to stop
the Court could further refine its constitutional analysis regarding war power and invalidate the tribunals
on domestic constitutional grounds.
179. 10 U.S.C. § 948b(f) (2006).
180. Benjamin G. Davis, No Third Class Processes for Foreigners, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY
88, 99 (2008); David L. Franklin, Enemy Combatants and the Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 1001, 1006 (2008); Gruber, supra note 33, at 1058 (discussing “several important
variances between MCA and UCMJ procedures”).
181. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. In addition, the MCA makes clear that it does not
seek to incorporate law of war protections more extensive than its own provisions. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 948b(f)–(g).
182. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
183. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (citing cases);
Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979)
(superseding treaty requires “explicit statutory language”); Pigeon River Imp., Slide & Boom Co. v.
Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934) (stating that “intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is
not to be lightly imputed to the Congress”); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115(1)(a) (1987) (stating that legislation must
have clear purpose to supersede treaty).
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individual invocations of the Geneva Conventions in military trials,
elsewhere it confirms that the Geneva Conventions retain the force of
international law.184 If the MCA is insufficiently clear to constitute an
express repeal of Geneva, the novel question becomes whether
Congress, without repealing a treaty, can “unexecute” it, that is, force
it to become non-self-executing.185
This is, however, a question the Court will not likely address,
given that military tribunals are being phased out and the number of
detainees is decreasing. Since the June 2008 decision in Boumediene
v. Bush permitting detainees to bring habeas corpus petitions despite
the MCA’s habeas-stripping provisions,186 district courts have
demonstrated a willingness to release detainees. For example, the
district court for the District of Columbia ordered the release of
Boumediene and several others on the ground that the government
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they were
“enemy combatants.”187 Hundreds of other detainees have been
released discretionarily and, as of the writing of this Essay in January
2010, only 196 remain.188 On January 22, 2009, President Obama
signed an Executive Order to shut down the Guantánamo facility
184. For example, the MCA states, “A military commission established under this chapter is a
regularly constituted court, affording all the necessary ‘judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples’ for purposes of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.”
MCA, 10 U.S.C. § 948b(f) (2006). See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Military Commissions Act, the
Geneva Conventions, and the Courts: A Critical Guide, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 73, 82 (2007) (noting
MCA’s “clear intent to preserve the Geneva Conventions intact”).
185. Addressing this question, Professor Vázquez states, “[T]here is no evidence that Congress
intended to ‘unexecute’ the self-executing provisions of the Geneva Conventions or otherwise deny any
part of them domestic legal force. A congressional attempt to do so, moreover, would raise substantial
questions under the Supremacy Clause.” Vázquez, supra note 184, at 91−92. Even graver concerns
would be raised if the “un-execution” was permitted to have retroactive effect. Cf. Gruber, supra note
33, at 1063 (“MCA’s directive that individual detainees are prohibited from invoking the Conventions
can be seen merely as Congress’s post-ratification view of Geneva self-execution, which is itself not
dispositive of and perhaps irrelevant to the treaty’s status.”). Resolving the “un-execution” question in
the affirmative would be decidedly anti-internationalist. Like the conservative construction of the selfexecution issue, it essentially allows Congress to tailor the force of human rights conventions
domestically while duplicitously purporting to support such rights. See supra notes 110–11 and
accompanying text.
186. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
187. Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp.2d 191, 197–98 (D.D.C. 2008).
188. See Peter Finn, Justice Task Force Recommends about 50 Guantanamo Detainees be Held
Indefinitely, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/01/21/AR2010012104936.html.

Published by Reading Room, 2011

35

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 12

334

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:2

within a year and harmonize U.S. interrogation tactics with the
Geneva Conventions.189 The one terrorism detention case pending at
the time before the Supreme Court that might have brought the
Geneva Conventions back into play, Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli,190 was
rendered moot in February 2009 when President Obama transferred
Al-Marri’s case to the criminal system.191
Still, recent events have served to revive the debate over military
tribunals. The one-year deadline for closing Guantanamo has come
and gone.192 Moreover, President Obama, apparently under pressure
from Congress, has retreated from his commitment to permanently
close the Bush terrorism play-book.193 He now endorses military
trials, albeit under an apparently more civil-rights oriented version of
Bush’s commissions,194 and supports indefinite detention of certain
189. The Executive Order reads in pertinent part:
The detention facilities at Guantánamo for individuals covered by this order shall be
closed as soon as practicable, and no later than 1 year from the date of this order. If
any individuals covered by this order remain in detention at Guantánamo at the time of
closure of those detention facilities, they shall be returned to their home country,
released, transferred to a third country, or transferred to another United States detention
facility in a manner consistent with law and the national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States.
Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4, 897 (Jan. 22, 2009).
190. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008) (granting certiorari).
191. “Enemy Combatant” Ali al-Marri Charged for Alleged Role in Terrorist Activities, FOX NEWS,
Feb. 27, 2009, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,501788,00.html. The Supreme Court
more recently dismissed the “Uighur case” from its docket and remanded the case to district court.
Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam). However, this case was in any event unlikely
to raise Geneva Convention issues because the case was about the propriety of a habeas court ordering
the release of unquestionably unlawfully detained prisoners into the United States. Id. The issue was not
the legality of the detention under international law.
192. One Year Later, Guantanamo Still Open, CBS NEWS, Jan. 22, 2010,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/01/22/politics/main6129494.shtml.
193. Jonathan Weisman & Evan Perez, Obama Leans Toward Switch to Military Trials on 9/11,
WALL
ST.
J.,
Mar.
6,
2010,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703915204575103703790191316.html (noting that Congress’s threat to cut funding
to civilian trials and local government resistance has led the Obama administration to favor trying
Khalid Sheik Mohammed in a military tribunal, despite a pledge to try him in federal court in New
York); Ed Pilkington, Obama to Continue Military Tribunals at Guantánamo, THE GUARDIAN, May 15,
2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/15/guantanamo-bay-military-trial-obama
(noting that the Guantánamo closure issue “has increasingly been highlighted by Republican politicians
who see it as a potential stick with which to beat the administration, and many Democrats, nervous
about the reaction of their constituents, have also expressed their alarm”).
194. See Lara Jakes, Obama to Revive Military Tribunals for Gitmo Detainees, with More Rights,
HUFFINGTON POST, May 14, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/14/obama-torevive-military-_n_203783.html.
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terror suspects.195 Meanwhile, trials under MCA procedures are ongoing.196 As a consequence, the possibility that the Supreme Court
will have another opportunity to rule on Geneva’s applicability to the
war on terror still exists. If the occasion arises, the Supreme Court
will have another chance to turn “the legal world right-side up
again”197 and to show that it is not a “lone ranger”198 by affirming the
domestic enforceability of the Geneva Conventions. Although
Medellín may have created yet another legalistic barrier between the
“war” detainees199 and their human rights, the case leaves some room
for a future decision giving effect to the Geneva Conventions.
CONCLUSION
As President Obama inches ever closer to embracing the “twilight
zone” model of terrorism law, it would be wise to keep in mind the
reputational harm the Bush administration’s war on terror caused the
United States. One human rights advocate warned the Obama
administration, “The results of the cases [tried in military
commissions] will be suspect around the world. It is a tragic mistake
to continue them.”200 More than just a source of embarrassment, there
are real consequences to America’s sullied international reputation.
Our experiments with “alternative” military justice not only affect
195. See supra note 188 (observing that the Obama administration has identified fifty Guantánamo
inmates that should be held indefinitely).
196. Apparently, government lawyers, now part of the Obama administration, are continuing to rely
on evidence obtained through torture. Del Quentin Wilber, ACLU Says Government Used False
Confessions, WASH. POST, July 2, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/07/01/AR2009070103477.html.
197. Koh, supra note 50, at 2352.
198. Ginsburg, supra note 29, at 335.
199. There is some point at which the Court is going to have to grapple with whether terrorism
detentions fall within a war paradigm. Thus far, the fact that the cases have involved Taliban or al Qaeda
persons with a connection to Afghanistan combined with continuing war-like conditions in Afghanistan
have allowed the Court to presume a war paradigm. See supra note 32. One expert notes that
characterizing terrorism as part of war furthers terrorists’ agenda by “allow[ing] terrorists to portray
themselves as military figures and their victims as ‘collateral damage.’” Pilkington, supra note 193
(quoting Shayana Kadidal, Guantánamo lawyer with the Centre for Constitutional Rights).
200. See Human Rights Activists Assail President Obama’s Decision on Military Commissions, ABC
NEWS: POLITICAL PUNCH, (May 15, 2009, 7:26 PM), http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/
2009/05/human-rights-ac.html (quoting Gabor Rona, International Legal Director of Human Rights
First).
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our high court’s world influence, they operatively prevent the United
States from assuming a leadership role in defining and defending
international human rights. For example, in 2007, the Chinese
government responded to the U.S. State Department’s annual human
rights report by stating that America had no standing to comment on
others’ human rights violations given its conduct of the war on terror.
Specifically, the Chinese characterized the United States as “pointing
the finger” at other nations while ignoring its “flagrant record of
violating the Geneva Convention.”201 Supreme Court validation of
treaty law would no doubt help repair the international reputation of
the United States.202
The lesson here is about fear and missed opportunity. Guantánamo
stands as a stark reminder of the great importance of international
humanitarian law during times of crisis. The Geneva Conventions
were the very barrier between terrorism detainees and a government
regime singularly committed to national security through any means
possible. Unfortunately, when international law mattered most, even
the liberal Supreme Court justices avoided cementing its legal status.
By contrast, Medellín, a convicted murderer, was apparently afforded
the full panoply of constitutional protections, and in all likelihood, his
inability to confer with consular officials did not prejudice his case.
Much less was at stake, and those on the Supreme Court critical of
humanitarian law impediments to waging the war on terror could
fashion anti-internationalist rules with little public fanfare or liberal
resistance. Consequently, although Hamdan will likely go down in
history as evidence of the Court’s willingness to protect individual
rights in the face of massive public fear and executive pressure, it
also represents a failure to truly support the comprehensive
201. See Edward Cody, Beijing Hits Back at U.S. for Raising Rights Concerns, WASH. POST, Mar. 9,
2007, at A16, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/08/AR2007030800747.html.
202. Even if the President forges ahead with policies contrary to international humanitarian law, the
Court can still do its part to salvage U.S. reputation. As one scholar writes, “An unequivocal cue from
the Supreme Court about the importance of international and comparative standards would have sent an
important human rights message and may have averted controversy and embarrassment resulting from
executive policies.” Laura E. Little, Transnational Guidance in Terrorism Cases, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L. REV. 1, 14 (2006).
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international regime governing war-time detention, a regime in which
the United States long ago vowed to participate. But all may not be
lost. The Supreme Court might have another chance to rule on the
status of the Geneva Conventions, and Medellín leaves some wiggle
room on self-execution. If the Supreme Court is once again to be a
beacon of judicial light, it must move beyond the xenophobic
exceptionalism of the Bricker past and embrace the straightforward
and fair principle that signed and ratified treaties are the law of the
land.
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